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Abstract 
 
In the two decades since the emergence of the European Union at Maastricht 
there has been a concerted attempt to build a European political space, 
typified by the debates on constitutionalisation and democratisation. Much 
less noticed, but no less important, has been the mobilisation of publics, 
interest groups and political parties against the integration process. In the 
light of the failure to realise the Laeken objectives, the stabilisation of an 
anti-integration bloc in the European Parliament, recurrent 'no' votes in 
national referenda and the emergence of an increasingly coordinated 
movement of critical interest groups, we argue that this opposition has 
become embedded and persistent, at both European and national levels. This 
will have considerable consequences for the Union itself and the way it has 
chosen to largely ignore sceptical voices to date. 
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Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon1 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades the EU has attempted to build a European political space as exemplified by the 
debates on constitutionalisation and democratisation. In recent years, in particular since the introduction 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the European integration process has  been increasingly  beset by obstacles, partly 
as the Union has been forced to face up to significant opposition to closer integration: the recent, 
piecemeal approach to reforming economic governance with the European Stability Mechanism and the 
Fiscal Compact typify the overall lack of strategic vision. This opposition – most commonly labelled 
Euroscepticism - has been exemplified by the EU’s failure to realise the Laeken objectives of bringing the 
Union closer to the people and of definitively allocating competences between European and national 
levels, the stabilisation of an anti-integration block in the European Parliament, recurrent ‘no’ votes in 
national referenda and the emergence of an increasingly coordinated movement of critical interest groups.  
Opposition to the EU has become increasingly embedded both at European and national levels and 
highlights the urgent need for the EU to engage constructively with dissenting voices and to consider 
alternative views about paths towards further European integration. This situation has become more 
critical as a result of the global economic and financial crisis and the continuing Eurozone crisis, as well 
as prospective enlargements towards the Western Balkans, Iceland and potentially Turkey. These 
developments have not only helped to further undermine citizen support for the EU but have also led to 
significant policy implications for both the EU and the member states within the Union.  Challenges to 
free movement and the single market in France, Denmark and the Netherlands, the ever more pointed 
intrusion into member states’ fiscal and budgetary policy and the seeming inability of European Council 
meetings to produce comprehensive solutions to the Eurozone crisis, have all propelled the EU into an 
unprecedented phase of uncertainty, contributing to deeper and more embedded Euroscepticism with the 
potential to cause irreparable damage to the EU’s quest for legitimacy and stability. 
 
Opposition to the EU has often historically been portrayed as a passing phenomenon, the inevitable ‘grit 
in the system’ that occurs when political systems are built and develop.  A case in point was one of the 
earliest significant works on Euroscepticism, by Benoit (1997), which portrayed the situation in France as 
                                                          
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the First Workshop of the University Association for 
Contemporary European Studies Collaboration Research Network on Euroscepticism, University of Surrey, 
July 2011, and at the University Association of Contemporary European Studies 41st Annual Conference, 
Cambridge, September 2011. Many thanks are due to all those involved in the discussions and refereeing that 
made this article and special possible, notably Oliver Daddow and Michael Holmes for their work at a JCMS 
workshop in February 2012. 
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essentially temporary and conditioned solely by endogenous circumstance within the country.  Even the 
dominant theoretical model in Eurosceptic studies – that of Szczerbiak & Taggart’s ‘hard/soft’ approach 
(2003) – does not acknowledge any a priori reason for the existance of Euroscepticism, except as a means 
of policy differentiation from centrist parties, an approach underlined by Sitter’s (2001) work on 
government-opposition dynamics.  While this is certainly not a universal understanding of Euroscepticism 
(see Flood, 2002), it has coloured debate and has reflected elite understanding as well.  We argue however 
that this is a misleading frame of reference and that it is necessary to engage with Euroscepticism in a 
fundamentally different manner. 
 
This article argues that while the European Union has made a conscious decision to shift towards a more 
popular and inclusive form of integration since the Maastricht Treaty, this has been of questionable 
success to date.  This shift is doubly ironic, given that the persistent (even growing) gap between elites 
and publics has long been identified and targetted through ever-increasing communication programmes 
from the European institutions and national governments (Bijsmans & Altides, 2007).  The failure of 
these programmes has usually been understood as a failure to communicate the Union’s values, since the 
literature points towards increasing knowledge being associated with increasing support (e.g. Gabel, 
1998), but it is also grounded in the emergence of a block of active opposition within both public opinion 
and political action, a block that has been prepared to spend its political capital in raising its concerns and 
fears.  When confronted with an elite establishment that has been unwilling to do the same – for reasons 
of low interest across the public as a whole – this has resulted in the embedding of opposition, effectively 
giving it a structural role in the integration process.2 To explore these ideas further, the article starts by 
discussing how opposition has emerged, particularly since the early 1990s.  It then offers an overview of 
the spread of opposition across the EU’s political system, at both national and European levels, before 
offering some thoughts on the implications of this for the EU’s development and the future study of 
Euroscepticism. 
 
The Emergence of Opposition 
While there was some disagreement within the six states who formed the original European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957 (for example French communists) in practice the elite consensus of the era, 
which concentrated on the benefits of economic integration and the need to bind previously hostile states 
together, bound the six together. This prevailing mood was largely accepted by the general public in these 
                                                          
2 We used the term ‘embedded’ here in the sense of Ruggie (1982) to mean pervasive and enduring, but not 
necessarily permanent. 
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countries eager to modernise after the strains of the Second World War.  It was not until the general wave 
of electoral volatility of the mid-70s, combined with the debate about the enlargement of the EU, that 
‘Europe’ began to develop as an issue in any significant way within the domestic sphere. In the three 
states which joined the EEC in 1973 (the UK, Ireland and Denmark)  the debate about whether to join 
(and the referendums that took place on this issue) ensured that ‘Europe’ emerged as an issue, impacting 
on the domestic arena and causing division in and between parties.  Norway’s rejection of EU 
membership by referendum in 1972 also ensured that the issue would remain on the political agenda 
outside as well as inside the EU. 
  
By the mid to late 1980s a broad consensus seemed to emerge at elite level among the EU member states 
about the value of economic integration as personified by the Single Market project. The successful 
marketing of the 1992 project ensured that even Greece and the UK (potential doubters) ratified the 
Single European Act (SEA) with relatively little public opposition manifested. Even the rump of French 
Front National Assembly members, temporarily promoted to the top table following President 
Mitterrand’s decision to introduce Proportional Representation in an attempt to split the mainstream right, 
did not vote against the SEA, choosing instead to abstain (see Startin, 2005, p.80). What opposition that 
existed against the European economic consensus tended to be small and marginal. For example, the 
Danish Folkebevægelsen mod EU (People’s Movement) which was founded in 1972 had some success in 
European elections but struggled to make any significant, permanent impact on the debate surrounding 
the direction of European integration. 
 
It was not until Margaret Thatcher’s Bruges speech (1988) which came as a response to Jacques Delors’s 
ambitions for closer economic and political cooperation, that opposition to the EU started to crystallize in 
any meaningful, mainstream way. The speech had a significant impact on the discourse surrounding the 
EU as she became the first leader to fundamentally challenge directly the direction in which it was 
progressing. It was around this time, as the emerging agenda surrounding the Maastricht Treaty was 
increasingly called into question by politicians, public and media, that the term Euroscepticism started to 
be deployed in media and political circles in the UK (see Flood, 2002).  There is no doubt that Maastricht 
marks a step-change in public awareness due to the nature of the proposals (see Flood, 2002; Startin, 
2005; Mudde, 2011; Verney, 2011; Vasilopoulou, this volume) and is significant for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, Maastricht signalled a new politicisation of European integration, with the name change from 
Community to Union and the creation of a new political order.  Secondly, it  marks the moment when 
divisions between European and domestic policy begin to become increasingly blurred in the areas of 
political, economic, social, legal, environmental and foreign affairs. Post-Maastricht, opposition to 
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‘Europe’ changed from being a straightforward question concerning the pros and cons of EU membership 
to one that was couched much more in terms of the rationale of the route that the European project is 
taking. As Ray (1999, p.86) points out succinctly: ‘The exact meaning of European integration does vary 
over time’ and ‘across national political contexts’ and this becomes more evident as a result of 
Maastricht. Flood (2002, p.75) notes that primarily as a result of these changes ‘opponents of European 
integration are constantly chasing something of a moving target’ which complicates analysis of the 
European dimension for practitoners and academics alike. Post Maastricht the EU as an issue drifts in and 
out of salience within domestic political debate as issues like The Amsterdam Treaty, the Euro, 
enlargement, the (failed) Constitutional Treaty, the subsequent Lisbon Treaty and currently the crisis in 
the Eurozone replace each other as the main focus of debate for opponents of European integration. 
Thirdly, Maastricht acts as a watershed, a key turning point in the debate surrounding the development of 
the EU as it marks the moment when referenda become a regular occurence in certain countries to ratify 
changes to EU treaties, serving to gavlanise Euroscpetics in their bid to derail the process of European 
integration. In June 1992 the Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty and in September the French narrowly 
voted in favour – a far from ringing endorsement given that current, previous and future Presidents 
(representing France’s three major parties) all campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote.  Finally, Maastricht acted as a 
pivotal point as the raised profile and salience of the EU allowed opportunistic politicians and leaders 
willing to mobilize public opposition to obtain national draw from the European issue.  Pan-European 
cooperation begins between nationally-organised sceptical interest groups, springing from shared 
adversity and common threats, drawing in groups where opposition might have previously been only 
latent and/or inopportune. In short, Maastricht acted as a catalyst as Euroscepticism spread across the EU, 
both in terms of political parties and in terms of public opinion.  
 
 
The Persistence of Opposition 
In this paper we argue that opposition to the EU has become increasingly embedded post-Maastricht both 
at European and national levels across a range of contexts and environments, no more so than in the day-
to-day existence of political parties within the Union’s member states. It is in this area of academic 
enquiry that the majority of studies have focused. There have been numerous works on Euroscepticism 
and comparative political parties (see Taggart, 1998; Ray, 1999; Hooghe et. al., 2002; Kopecky & 
Mudde, 2002; Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003, 2008; Marks et. Al,. 2006; Vasilopoulou, 2011) as well as 
individual party case studies targeting countries within and beyond the EU (see Raunio, 1999; Conti, 
2003; Startin, 2005; Skinner, 2010; Stojic, 2011). Many studies have adopted this narrow focus on 
political parties (and to a lesser extent public opinion), even though it is apparent that since Maastricht 
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Euroscepticism is now embedded at various other levels such as non-party groups, within governments 
and within the media. At the same time referenda and European Parliament elections have re-enforced 
this sense of embededness as Euroscepticism  has taken on new levels of salience. We have now entered 
an era where Euroscepticism has become an increasingly transnational and pan-European, phenomenon. 
These developments have been somewhat neglected by the academic community which has over-focused 
on divisions in the literature based largely around the role of political parties. Mudde’s (2011) recent, 
worthy discussion of the divisions in the literature between the so-called Sussex (primarily country-based 
cases highlighting strategic concerns) and North Carolina  schools (primarily cross-national studies, 
focusing on ideology) is a case in point, with its main focus on party classifications. While the role of 
political parties and their relationship with Europe’s citizens are central to our understanding of 
Euroscepticism and its overall reach within states’ political systems, we argue that a more holistic, 
nuanced and inter-disciplinary approach is required in order to obtain a full understanding of the way it 
has become increasingly embedded across the Union, as typified by the content of this special edition 
with contributions not uniquely focusing on parties (e.g. FitzGibbon; Startin & Krouwel; Guerra; 
Serricchio et al this volume). In the next section of the article we therefore look not only at political 
parties and public opinion, but focus as well on the embedded nature of Euroscepticism within 
governments, within the anti EU block in the European Parliament, within non-party groups as well as the 
crucial role played by referenda and European elections. 
 
Political parties  
Building on Taggart (1998) and Szczerbiak & Taggart’s (2003; 2008) seminal works in the area of 
Euroscepticism and political parties it is clear that ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parties exist in almost 
every member state and that - contrary to Taggart’s (1998) original analysis - some increasingly exist in 
government.  Broadly speaking it is possible to identify four different classifications of Eurosceptic 
parties: Firstly, single-issue pro-sovereignty parties such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the 
Danish Folkebevægelsen (People’s Movement) that are opposed to European integration per se. These are 
parties that adopt a ‘hard Eurosceptic’ discourse, which have made no significant electoral impact beyond 
the context of European elections but which are embedded within the domestic party systems within the 
context of elections for the European Parliament (see Usherwood, 2010). The second type of Eurosceptic 
party identifiable within this overview are Radical Right parties (RRPs) for whom opposition to the EU 
has become a central policy plank as they have sought to widen their domestic appeal beyond their 
traditional ‘bread and butter’ anti-immigrant discourse. The extent of opposition to the EU varies from 
party to party and country to country – contrast the British National Party’s (BNP’s) vehement opposition 
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to the EU with the Flemish Vlaams Belang’s more measured approach - but there is no doubt that 
opposing Europe has become an increasingly embedded part of RRPs and their overall policy packages 
(see Mudde, 2007, Hainsworth, 2008). Parties like the French Front National (FN) and the Freiheitliche 
Partei Österreichs (FPÖ: Austrian Freedom party)  which have a long history of Eurosceptic dialogue 
and rhetoric, have been joined in recent years by parties who have made significant electoral 
breakthroughs, such as Geert Wilders’ Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV: Party for Freedom) and 
Perussuomalaiset (True Finns) where opposition to the EU and the Eurozone is closely linked to the 
issues of immigration and globalisation. Added to this we have also witnessed the emergence in recent 
years among some RRPs (like the French FN) of what Lecoeur (2007) describes as Euromondialisme 
where a strong link is made in terms of rhetoric and discourse between opposition to Europe and 
opposition towards globalisation; the former being portrayed as a ‘half-way house’ or ‘stepping stone’ 
towards the perceived perils of the latter. In the wake of the crisis in the Eurozone the Euromondialist 
discourse adopted by some RRPs looks set to become increasingly fertile ground in electoral terms, as 
recently evidenced by Marine Le Pen's score of 18 per cent in the first round of the 2012 French 
Presidential elections. 
 
A third category of Eurosceptic party are left-wing parties beyond the mainstream left, opposed to the 
neo-liberal direction in which they see European integration progressing and who believe that the EU is 
increasingly being run as a capitalist club on behalf of capitalists (see Milner, 2004). Such parties have 
enjoyed quite significant electoral success in recent years, deploying an alternative vision of a more social 
Europe with a clearer global vision. Parties such as the Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People’s 
Party), Die Linke in Germany, The Swedish Vänsterpartiet (Left party) and the Bloco de Esquerda (Left 
Block) in Portugal are becoming increasingly established parties within their own party systems (see 
Keith, 2010). Eurosceptic Green parties in Scandinavia and the UK can also legitimately be included in 
this category. 
 
The fourth and final classification of Eurosceptic parties which are becoming increasingly embedded in 
European states’ party systems are those mainstream parties who are increasingly adopting a ‘soft 
Eurosceptic’ discourse on issues like the EU budget, the future of the Euro and further enlargement. 
These are usually (but not exclusively) mainstream right parties who appear to respond to volatile and 
negative public opinion on the issue. While in the past such discourse has been primarily associated with 
parties in opposition (see Taggart, 1998) the goal posts have shifted as there are clear examples of 
government parties adopting the rhetoric of juste retour over traditional communitarianism.  An obvious 
example is the UK Conservative party which withdrew from the European People’s party (EPP) European 
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Parliament grouping in June 2009 and launched the ‘soft Eurosceptic’ European Conservative and 
Reformists group (ECR) with The Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) and the Czech 
Občanská Demokratická Strana (Civic Democratic Party), along with smaller parties from Poland, 
Belguim, the Netherlands, Hungary, Latvia and Lithuania (see Bale et. al., 2010). Euroscepticism is also 
becoming slowly embedded in some aspects of govermental policy and rhetoric beyond parties in the 
ECR group with even founding EU member states showing themselves susceptible (see Taggart & 
Szczerbiak’s discussion in this volume).  Thus an element of ‘soft’ Eurosceptic discourse has crept into 
the governing parties and governments in France and Germany with the Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire (UMP) adopting a tough line on issues like Turkish enlargement and the Christlich Soziale 
Union (CSU) questioning the economic burden of bailing out other members of the Eurozone. Even 
Liberal parties like the UK Liberal Democrats and the German Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) have in 
recent years been forced to rein in their euro-enthusiasm when faced with the realities of coalition 
government and the need to juggle a range of disparate public opinion. 
 
Public Opinion 
Drawing largely on Eurobarometer data a number of studies have charted the volatility and increased 
negativity of public opinion post-Maastricht with regard to attitudes towards the EU (see Van der Eijk & 
Franklin, 1996; Gabel, 1998, 2000).  It has become clear that opposition and ambivalence towards the EU 
have become increasingly embedded among a growing number of European citizens across the EU 27 and 
in certain candidate countries. Based on the much-cited attitudinal questions in the biannual 
Eurobarometer surveys it is apparent that negative attitudes towards the EU have not only increased in 
countries with traditionally high levels of Euroscepticism such as the UK and Denmark, but also in 
founding states (Germany and France), in traditionally Europhile nations such as Ireland and the 
Netherlands and in new members such as Poland and the Czech Republic. In short, public attitudes have 
never recovered to the highs of 1991where 72 per cent of respondents stated that membership of the EU 
was a good thing and 59 per cent stated that their country had benefitted from EU membership 
(Eurobarometer, 1991).  By the end of 2011 (Eurobarometer, 2011), 26 per cent of respondents had a 
negative image of the EU, compared to 31 per cent with a positive image, with nearly as many pessimistic 
(46 per cent) about the EU’s future as were optimistic (48 per cent).  The sense of disconnection is very 
strong:  65 per cent of respondents felt that their voice did not count in the Union and 51 per cent felt their 
country’s interests were not taken into account. Moreover, 51 per cent felt they didn’t understand how the 
Union works. Thus, it is unsurprising that trust in EU and its its institutions has fallen markedly in recent 
years. Never has McCormick’s (2005, p.131) statement that ‘it sometimes seems as though the work of 
the EU goes on despite public opinion, which is often confused, sometimes doubtful, and in some cases 
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actively hostile’ seemed more pertinent. With the current global economic crisis putting the Eurozone 
under increasing strain Euroscepticism looks set to become increasingly embedded at the level of public 
opinion.    
 
 
The anti-EU block in the European Parliament  
Another area where we have witnessed a further embedding of Euroscepticism is in the European 
Parliament where the rump of Eurosceptic MEPs and transnational political groups have grown in size 
and stature at each European election, in particular in those elections post-Maastricht. Prior to Maastricht, 
Eurosceptic MEPs remained largely unattached or in informal groupings such as the Rainbow Group. 
After the 1994 election the soft Eurosceptic grouping Union for Europe emerged, later to become the 
Europe of Nations group for the duration of the two parliaments between 1999 and 2009. The Group for a 
Europe of Democracies and Diversities (a hard Eurosceptic group) was set up in 1999, then relaunched as 
the Independence/Democracy Group in 2004. In terms of left-wing Eurosceptic groups, the Confederal 
Group of the European United Left was created in 1994 and has developed steadily, both in terms of 
numbers and influence.  In February 2007 Radical Right MEPs set up a short-lived and ill-fated 
transnational group - Identity Tradition Sovereignty - which disbanded in November the same year, 
comprising MEPs from seven countries, including the FN and the FPÖ (see Startin, 2010).  The 
experiment illustrated the potential for transnational cooperation around the theme of Euroscepticism 
from the most unlikely ideological bedfellows.  
 
The 2009 elections yielded more Eurosceptic MEPs than any of the previous contests and resulted in the 
emergence of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group, a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic group 
comprising 27 MEPs from 8 different parties, under the leadership of UKIP’s Nigel Farage and the Lega 
Nord’s Francesco Speroni. It also saw the UK Conservatives push the formation of the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic 
grouping, the European Conservatives and Reform group (ECR) with 56 MEPs.  The Radical Right failed 
to form a group in 2009, although there are currently 29 unattached MEPs (mostly Radical Right) in the 
current Eurpoean Parliament. The Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left now 
comprises 41 members. With over a tenth of the Parliament now representing critical voices – admittedly 
of very varying kinds – there has been the scope to establish a critical mass, where ideas and practice are 
shared: as Costa and Brack (2009) and Brack (this volume) have noted, despite differing conceptions of 
their role, sceptical MEPs have built a framework of relations within the institutions that constitutes a 
base for leveraging their profile and influence. 
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Non-party groups 
While parties have developed considerably in their expression of Eurosceptic views, it is important to 
remember that they are not the only way in which opposition has been articulated and become 
increasingly embedded.  Most notably, there has been an extensive formation of non-party groups across 
Europe (and one which remains under-researched among the academic community; a recent exception is 
FitzGibbon, 2009) forming what might reasonably be termed an anti-EU movement.  This collection of 
assorted groups has created an ever more complex ecosystem to sustain and develop Eurosceptic 
discourse and action. This ecosystem operates primarily at the national level: groups can be found in 
every member state, as well as in neighbouring countries (see FitzGibbon, this volume).  In almost every 
case, there are several groups within a country, partly because of some functional specialisation, partly 
through ideological or strategic differences: it is of some note that the only country to have retained one 
dominant grouping is Norway (Nej til EU), the only country to have rejected EU membership.  More 
typical is Ireland, where two main groups – the National Platform and the Peoples’ Movement – have 
developed a range of actions, building on the Nice and Lisbon referenda campaigns, supported by the 
Peace and Neutrality Alliance, a pacifist organisation.  Together these groups were able to provide a range 
of perspectives and critiques in public debates beyond that possible within the party political system (see 
Tonra, 2009). 
The shape and structure of national non-party movements is primarily structured by the national political 
opportunity structure (see Usherwood, 2006). Such groups are more common where it is more difficult to 
access the party political system.  When combined with the relatively high levels of public opposition in 
the country, it should not be surprising to find the fullest development of anti-EU groups is found in the 
UK.  At its height, around 2000, there were approximately 30 groups in operation, ranging from think 
tanks (the European Foundation) to ginger groups (the Bruges Group), from single issue groups (Trade 
Unions Against the Single Currency) to grassroots organisations (the Democracy Movement) 
(Usherwood, 2002).  While this has fallen in recent years, with the diminishing political heat over the 
Euro and the Laeken process, there still remain a sizeable number of organisations, each typically 
working on a specific issue or aiming for a specific audience. 
Also of increasing note is the development of trans-European networks of contact and exchange.  Here 
the primary body is the European Alliance of EU-Critical Movements (TEAM), which links some 50 
national groups in 18 states.  TEAM works on the basis of shared information and practice, rather than 
attempting to regularize or introduce a common platform, an approach that has been the standard for 
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trans-national interaction between groups.  The proliferation of Eurosceptic websites and the emergence 
of a sceptic community in Brussels have also both contributed to increasing levels of contact at a bilateral 
level. 
 
 
The Role of Referendums 
Although referendums have historically been viewed as a means of bringing EU citizens closer to the EU, 
the stark reality is that they have served to further embed Euroscepticism in terms of the perception of EU 
citizens. As Dinan (2000, p.397) ellucidated over a decade ago: ‘Referenda have become an integral and 
important part of the European integration process. Whether constitutionally mandated or politically 
inspired, they have been used to decide whether or not to join or stay in the EC/EU and to ratify major 
treaty revisions.’ However, since Dinan’s observation, outcomes have increasingly gone against the 
wishes of EU elites and national governments. Of the 21 EU-related referenda that have taken place in the 
new millennium, six have produced ‘no’ votes (see Table 1) and in countries where voters have 
experienced membership (i.e. not including those in candidate countries prior to enlargement) only four of 
11 votes have resulted in a ‘yes’ vote, two of these being re-runs of previously negative mandates in 
Ireland (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
There is no doubt that referenda have served to increase the salience of EU related issues at crucial 
moments in the development of the EU, allowing a Eurosceptic triumvirate of political parties, non-party 
groups and media to galvanise support and to gain legitimacy for the anti-EU cause. Whereas the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Euro made the EU a high priority for mainstream politicians who put effort into 
selling the EU’s benefits (and succeeded in shifting some opinion) any such enthusiasm has now faded in 
most states (e.g. Eurobarometer, 2011 does not list integration as an important issue for respondents). 
Opposition elements are clearly left as the most active participants in the debate as the quiet, permissive 
consensus of those supporting the Union is unable to compete with the louder, more passionate 
commitment of Eurosceptics. Following the ‘no votes in France and the Netherlands in 2005 (see 
Krouwel & Startin (this volume) for the continuing impact of these) and in Ireland in 2008, the use of 
referenda looks set to continue to decline (except where constitutionally mandated in countries like 
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Denmark and Ireland),  particularly as a result of the increased ‘scapegoating’ of Brussels faced with the 
management of the Eurozone crisis. De Gaulle’s observation as articulated in 1960 that  ‘Europe will only 
truly be born’ through the validity of ‘popular referendums.....in all countries concerned’  (as quoted in 
Hug, 2002) seems a long way from reality 50 years on.   
 
The Role of the Media 
It is clear that national media have played a key role in shaping attitudes towards the EU and contributing 
to the increasingly embedded nature of Euroscepticism in various states. Much focus in this area has been 
centred around the UK where the press have been forthright in their opposition towards the EU and its 
percevied threat to UK sovereignty. In a seminal piece Anderson (2004, p.54) observed of the tabloid Sun 
newspaper that it is ‘vigourously and virulently Eurosceptic, conjouring up the image of the EU as a 
corrupt and untrustworthy predator, driven by a Franco-German plot to damage British Economic 
interests, British security and British Sovereignty.’  Anderson (2004, p.170) also observed that ‘the 
current modus operandi of much of the London-based Eurosceptic press is a serious problem for UK 
democracy for which no effective voluntary or compulsory regulatory solution seems seriously to be on 
the table as far as policy makers are concerned.’ The situation with regard to the UK has, if anything, 
become even more one-sided, the Murdoch Press, the Daily Mail and Daily Telegraph have been joined 
by a strongly Euro-critical Daily Express which runs regular front pages in virulant criticism of the EU 
and was instrumental in galvanising the 100,000 strong Have Your Say petition in 2011 which lead to a 
parliamentary vote in the House of Commons over whether there should be a referendum on UK 
membership.  
 
While the situation in other countries is not as one-sided there are clear examples of Eurosceptic discourse 
prominent in other member states’ media such as Ireland, Denmark, Austria and Sweden, to name but a 
few (c.f. Harmsen & Spiring, 2004; de Vreese, 2007). Ireland is a clear example of how the Eurosceptic 
press has taken on a clear trans-national dynamic with  British owned red-tops like The Sun running pro-
‘no’ vote campaigns in their Irish editions during the campaigns for the two Irish referendums in 2008 
(see Holmes, 2008 and 2009). While we should clearly acknowledge what Anderson (2004) succinctly 
labels  the age-old sociological ‘debate within the literature as to what extent people actually believe what 
they read in the newspapers’ there is no doubt that anti-EU media discourse has contributed  to the 
increasingly embedded nature of Euroscepticism as a phenomon in certain EU member states (e.g. 
Boomgaarden et al., 2010). This is particulary the case in countries like the UK where the other side of 
the argument is largely not transmitted to the public at large.  
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The Papers in this Special Issue 
The special issue brings together a wide range of approaches and examples to illustrate the way in which 
Euroscepticism has become pervasive, embedded and persistent.  Together, they seek to offer a fuller, 
more nuanced understanding of how this has come about, present the dimensions along which we might 
explore Euroscepticism and start to fully address the question of what consequences this has for the 
European Union and the future of European integration more generally. 
 
Taggart and Szczerbiak build on their seminal works (2003, 2008) by revisiting and challenging earlier 
models of Euroscepticism, which pitched it primarily as a strategic device used by parties outside of 
government.  By considering how Eurosceptics have been able to become parties of government in 
countries across the Union, they offer new insight into this maturation and mainstreaming of the 
phenomenon.  In a similar vein, Guerra considers the shift in popular attitudes that has taken place in the 
past decade, specifically in new member states.  While this is partly a factor of accession, Guerra’s work  
points towards the increased importance of economic and utilitarian considerations in popular 
evaluations, a development that is likely to be strengthened further by the eurozone crisis.  This latter 
point relates well with the findings of Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia, who conclude that while the 
global financial crisis of 2007-8 did not necessarily result in increased Euroscepticism at the level of 
public opinion, this is not necessarily the case for the subsequent eurozone crisis.  They argue that the 
reason for this is that the former crisis was conceptualized by publics as having primarily national 
solutions, while the latter places member states more clearly within the EU framework, with the 
consequence that the Union is under pressure to be seen to be an efficient political and economic actor.  
Indeed, Startin and Krouwel’s work suggests that it might be necessary to look to an earlier critical 
juncture – the 2005 referendums in France and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty – to find the 
roots of the heightened profile and increased scope of Euroscepticism.  The challenge to the permissive 
consensus that these votes represented, albeit partly conditioned by attitudes towards politics and 
politicians more generally, has opened up new discursive spaces for critical perspectives on the 
integration process. 
 
As we have argued in this article, it is also important to move beyond the ‘usual suspects’ of political 
parties and public opinion when analysing Euroscepticism.  Brack’s contribution is a case in point with its 
examination of Eurosceptics within the European Parliament, an institution normally conceptualized as 
intrinsically pro-European.  Brack’s extensive fieldwork highlights the various ways in which 
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Eurosceptics have used the platform of the EP to gain political leverage or profile, in both European and 
national arenas, as well as reinforcing their resource base through collective collaborative activity.  This 
links in to FitzGibbon’s work on civil society groups in three member states, each of which has seen 
groups become consequential political actors, leading or shaping public debate on the EU.  This increased 
traction for Eurosceptic voices can only partly be understood by media environments, since it also speaks 
to the unwillingness of more pro-EU voices to fight a cause that struggles to find much resonance with 
citizens.  In the case of countries outside the Union – as Skinner-Sundlisæter discusses – these voices can 
often be dominant, particularly when considering cases where membership is a live political issue.  
Skinner-Sundlisæter suggests that in recognising that Euroscepticism is not purely a function of 
membership, it is important to bring that understanding into our modelling of the phenomenon. 
 
In the final section of the special issue, we look beyond the present to consider the ramifications of an 
embedded and persistent Euroscepticism.  By bringing in the arguments of Andrew Duff and his 
reflections on the need for active debate, it is hoped that this might stimulate a new space for debate that 
has thus far been lacking.  While Duff makes clear his disagreement with the positions that are adopted, 
his willingness to engage in discussion, as we argue below, represents a step towards the identification of 
common ground.  In narrower academic terms, Vasilopoulou’s review of the debates within the literature 
points towards a new historiography of Euroscepticism and the emergence of a new phase of Eurosceptic 
activity.  In so doing, it pulls together many of the debates discussed in the rest of the special issue and 
provides a springboard to future research agendas in this field. 
 
 
The Consequences of Opposition 
In this article, we have argued for an understanding of Euroscepticism as an increasingly embedded and 
persistent phenomenon within the integration process.  Voices of dissent and opposition are to be found 
throughout national and European political systems and debates.  This raises the key question of what 
consequence this might have and how it should be addressed, if at all. 
 
Notwithstanding the embedding of Euroscepticism, opposition (certainly of the outright kind) remains 
marginal and heterodox behaviour, in the sense that it has not been able to achieve its objectives of 
stopping, reversing or fundamentally redirecting the development of what is now the European Union.  
The breadth and depth of the elite consensus in Europe around the value of integration after the Second 
World War ensured that by the time significant voices of doubt and dissent were raised, there was a 
strong wellspring of support that could contain, and to a large extent ignore, those voices.  The 
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realignment of many elite groups to the realities of an increasingly intertwined and interdependent 
economic and political project, both at a material and an attitudinal level, has produced a strong position 
for further development of that project, or at least the status quo.  We do not make any particular claims 
here, but such realignment can be understood either as a consequence of a path-dependency, as in the 
historical institutionalist perspective (see Pierson, 1996), or as a stage in a functionalist realignment of 
loyalties to the European level (see Haas, 1968): in either case, it has been largely successful in keeping 
scepticism and opposition in a structurally weak position. 
 
Despite this strong status quo, it is nevertheless important to recognise that the EU is moving into a 
different (and more difficult) phase of its existence (see Vasilopoulou, this volume).  No longer does the 
Union find itself in a period of major advances in terms of its development, in the way that it did in the 
1950s and again in the 1990s.  The protracted and painful unwinding of the Laeken process through the 
2000s resulted in a Lisbon treaty that essentially reaffirmed the process to date, rather than a truly 
‘ground-up’ reappraisal of the system.  The difficulties in reaching even this modest consolidation suggest 
that there is no longer a widespread desire for major structural reform in the short and medium term.  This 
trend is further reinforced by the severe impact of the global financial crisis since 2007, with all of its 
implications for national financial and economic retrenchment and for its impact on weaker economic 
growth, the latter historically having been associated with slowing in integration (see Dinan, 2005 for an 
historical perspective and Tsoukalis, 2011 for a recent view).  The creation a fiscal compact outside the 
EU treaties highlighted the reluctance of some member states to use the EU itself as a vehicle for further 
integration, while the continuing eurozone crisis has become an important factor in the survival of 
governments from Greece, to the Netherlands, to Ireland.  With this slowdown in integration in mind, 
from the sceptic camp’s perspective, it becomes ever easier to find shortcomings in existing EU practice, 
knowing that major resolution is not likely to be forthcoming at any great speed.  As the periodic 
‘relaunches’ of integration have demonstrated, the system needs to be constantly reviewed and updated if 
it is not to be overtaken by events. 
 
Coupled to this slowdown in integration is the historic stance that elites have taken towards sceptic views, 
namely one of ignoring them, or at least of giving that impression.  This was most vividly seen in the ‘re-
runs’ of the referendums on Maastricht in Denmark and on Nice and Lisbon in Ireland, where there was a 
clear impression that people were being told to ‘vote again and get it right’ (Economist, 8 October 2009).  
Likewise, the inability or unwillingness of the Convention on the Future of the EU to engage with the 
alternative draft presented by sceptic delegates (Usherwood, 2007) was emblematic of the difficulties that 
oppositional voices have been faced with when given such opportunities.  Even in the environment where 
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they have carved out the most noticable space (the European Parliament),  the choice for sceptic MEPs is 
either to absent themselves completely or risk socialisation into the institution’s practices and norms 
(Costa and Brack, 2009). 
 
We would argue that notwithstanding the prepondence of communautaire views within the EU (and 
particularly its institutions), it is ultimately damaging to the Union to persist in ignoring sceptics.  A 
central claim of the EU in the post-Maastricht era has been its transformation into a democratic and 
popular construction, where publics are listened to, engaged with and served: a task set out once again at 
Laeken.  If the Union is to claim to be of relevance to publics, through the provision of effective and 
legitimate outputs, then perforce it must overtly engage with the full range of public opinion, a point 
explored at more length by Tambakaki (2011).  The longer that this situation is left to persist, especially 
when there is no grand projet to focus attention, the more likely it becomes that opposition will become 
ever more normalised and stronger: it acts as another part of the sceptics’ critique of the Union that it does 
not even attempt to open a dialogue with them. 
 
In the much longer term, this risks challenging the status quo that has protected the EU so far.  As the 
events of the Euro crisis have shown, it is possible to mobilise popular attitudes against the Union within 
a country in a relatively short period of time, as evidenced by the marked drops in support and trust in the 
EU with the latter falling from 57 per cent in spring 2007 to 34 per cent in autumn 2011 (See 
Eurobaromete,r 2011).  The currently open-ended nature of the crisis would seem to point towards further 
difficulties for both the Union and for national governments, be they member states that need support, or 
ones shouldering the responsibility of that support.  As Euroscepticism becomes increasingly embedded 
at the various levels identified in this paper, it is ultimately in the European Union’s interest to engage 
with sceptics, if it is ever to secure its overally legitmacy and future success. A failure to do so as Europe 
enters an uncertain economic phase could have serious consequences for the European project as a whole. 
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Table 1: Referenda on the EU since 2000 
Year Country Issue 
Per cent of ‘No’ 
votes 
2000 Denmark Join euro 53 
2001 Ireland Nice Treaty 54 
2002 Ireland Nice Treaty 37 
2003 Malta Accession 46 
2003 Slovenia Accession 11 
2003 Hungary Accession 16 
2003 Lithuania Accession 10 
2003 Slovakia Accession 7 
2003 Poland Accession 22 
2003 Czech Republic Accession 22 
2003 Sweden Join euro 58 
2003 Estonia Accession 33 
2003 Latvia Accession 33 
2005 Spain Constitution 23 
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2005 France Constitution 55 
2005 Netherlands Constitution 62 
2005 Luxembourg Constitution 44 
2008 Ireland Lisbon Treaty 53 
2009 Ireland Lisbon Treaty 33 
2012 Croatia Accession 34 
2012 Ireland 
Fiscal Compact 
Treaty 40 
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